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Introduction: 
 
There is an intimate relationship between poverty reduction, sector performance and the institutional 
arrangements in federal settings. One major dilemma of fiscal federalism literature relates to the 
mechanism of financing subnational governments i.e. the instruments and systems used to raise 
revenue, and allocate funds. These mechanisms are the key determinants of the effectiveness of social 
service delivery in sectors such as health and education. Thus, the development of efficient fiscal 
federalism is the key to success of social services.   
 
The existing literature is replete with rhetorical emphasis on either of the two mechanisms, that is, 
federal transfers and subnational tax autonomy. In fact, the problem lies in the question being asked. 
Instead of asking which of the two mechanisms constitutes a better approach to fiscal adjustment, the 
question should rather be the extent to which revenue powers (i.e., taxes and user charges) should be 
devolved for accountability and the extent to which federal spending powers should be maintained for 
efficiency and equity.  
 
However, offering technocratic solutions is not enough. In fact, strategic behaviour of the political 
officials at the central and subcentral levels can create distortions in the actual operationalization of 
the constitutional division of powers and responsibilities leading to unintended outcomes.  
 
Thus, in addition to a sound system of intergovernmental financial relations we also need a definite set 
of institutional mechanisms and procedures that can be used to get around political problems. Since 
these problems are related to incentives and self-interest, the need is to create a self-enforcing system 
with in-built incentives for self-imposed fiscal ethics whereby the political officials at the two levels, 
find it in their best self-interest to avoid indulging in welfare-reducing strategic behaviours, and mutual 
blame-shifting. In such a set of institutions both levels of government will mutually recognise the 
other’s comparative fiscal advantages and the limits on their legitimate spheres of action.  
 
This paper suggests two solutions: (a) Combine subnational revenue control with fiscal equalization 
system in a macroframework (b) Integrate civil society, legal-institutional (arbitral institutional 
machinery) and political-bargaining approaches so that an independent arbitrating agency can work in 
cooperation with the civic organizations and collaborative intergovernmental processes to resolve 
fiscal imbalances.   
  
I. A Balanced Perspective on Fiscal Federalism 
 
From the national perspective on fiscal federalism, transfers are useful in their own right because they 
reflect “federal spending priorities” (Boadway 2005, p. 72). Transfers, in this view, enable the central 
government to replicate the efficiency and equity outcomes of a unitary state (Boadway and Flatters 
1982; Boadway and Tremblay 2006). This approach however, can rationalise the intrusive actions by 
the federal government that lead to coercive fiscal relations characterised by federal pre-emption of 
state and local authority (see Kincaid 1990). On the other hand, the sub-national perspective on fiscal 
federalism goes to the other extreme and argues that transfers are weak policy instruments that sever 
the connection between spending and taxing authority. This perspective advocates a high degree of 
subnational tax autonomy (Weingast 2006) and insists that SNGs should finance their actions with 
their own-source tax revenues (Warren 2006, p. 49). It universally assumes that institutional 
mechanisms designed to grant independent revenue-raising authority to SNGs are always desirable as 
they will harden the budget constraint for SNGs (Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack 2003).   
 
The balanced perspective on fiscal federalism implies that when implemented beyond a certain limit, 
either policy instrument (subnational tax autonomy or transfers) can cause tensions in the federal 
system and result in reduced efficiency. An excess of both can create incentives for SNGs to behave 
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irresponsibly. Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981) and Wildasin (1997) studied the irresponsible 
behaviour associated with intergovernmental transfers, and Dillinger and Webb (2001) and 
Prud’homme (1995) highlighted the irresponsible behavioural patterns typically associated with 
subnational tax autonomy.  SNGs with fiscal autonomy may rationally decide to under-tax and under-
provide market-promoting public goods and services (ignore positive externalities). However, SNGs’ 
excessive reliance on federal transfers can cause negative externalities, including over-borrowing and 
overspending on rent seeking and corruption.  
 
Thus, the most desirable system of allocations avoids efficiency losses, resulting from either financial 
dependency, or subnational fiscal operations. In fact, the emerging literature has begun to focus on 
combining subnational tax autonomy with a fiscal equalization system especially for enhancing welfare 
in markets of tax competition (e.g. Köthenbürger 2005, Bucovetsky and Smart 2006). Following the 
ideas contained in this genre of literature, it can be argued that a system with an optimal level of 
asymmetry that is adequately addressed with transfers, sets the incentives right for tax policy at SNG 
level.  
 
To illustrate the point, I first present a comparison of the two extreme forms of policy environments 
in figure 1 and then illustrate, in figure 2, the subnational tax policy in a balanced policy environment 
that combines subnational revenue control with fiscal equalization system.  
 
A sensible assumption about subnational tax policy is that SNGs design their revenue maximizing 
strategies in context of their specific policy environments. I assume two extreme policy environments. 
In Type-I policy environment, I assume an extreme form of revenue decentralization. In this situation, 
SNGs face competitive incentives to increase their revenues by increasing tax rates on immobile tax 
bases and reducing tax rates on mobile tax bases. The latter policy will increase revenues by attracting 
more mobile tax bases into the jurisdiction. In Type-II policy environment, I assume an extreme form 
of revenue centralization. In this situation, SNGs face competitive incentives to attract more 
equalization grants. To accomplish this goal, they reduce their tax effort on immobile tax bases and 
impose high tax rates on mobile tax bases. The latter policy will decrease revenues by repelling mobile 
tax bases out of the jurisdiction.  
 
Figure 2 illustrates a third type of policy environment where subnational revenue control is combined 
with equalization transfers. In this system, both kinds of perverse incentives will work in opposite 
direction leading to a classical case of multiple distortions and the second best result.  In such a policy 
environment, if an SNG adopts extreme tax policy type-I, it will be entitled to lower equalization 
grants that will offset revenue gain due to inflow of the mobile tax base. The simple logic of such a 
system can be understood as follows: A particular region lowers its tax rate on mobile tax bases.  This 
leads to an inflow of capital into that region, which alleviates the revenue loss on account of reduction 
in tax rate. However, this attempt by a region to improve its own mobile tax base causes a 
corresponding tax base loss from neighboring regions. Thus, tax revenues of neighbouring regions 
deteriorate. The net outcome is an inefficient supply of public goods. The equalization scheme then 
responds by lower entitlements of the tax-lowering region and higher entitlements of the other 
regions. Thus, an equalization system reduces pressures of tax competition and allows SNGs to set 
higher rates. On the other hand, if an SNG adopts extreme tax policy type-II, it will lose mobile tax 
base that will offset gains from more federal grants.  
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Figure 1:   Extreme Policy Environments and Subnational Tax Policies 
SNG’s Tax Policy Type-I Goal: Maximization of own-revenues 
Extreme 
Policy 
Environment 
Type-I 
High Revenue 
Decentralization 
More Revenue: (due to 
expansion of tax-base) 
x+1 
Mobile x-1 
Tax Base  Tax Rate Own Revenue 
Immobile More Revenue 
Perverse incentives for strategic tax policy  
Equalization Grants 
n/a 
SNG’s Tax Policy Type-II Goal:  Maximization of Equalization Grants 
High Revenue 
Centralization 
Extreme 
Policy 
Environment 
Type-II 
Notes: n/a : Not applicable 
x+1= Higher than average rate; x-1= Lower than average rate. 
 Less Revenue (due to 
contraction of Tax-Base  
x-1 
Mobile x+1 
Tax Base  Tax Rate Own Revenue 
Immobile Less Revenue 
Perverse incentives for strategic tax policy  
Equalization Grants 
More Grants 
 x-1 
There is an 
optimal level of 
asymmetry that 
is adequately 
addressed with 
Transfers  
SNG’s Optimum Tax Policy   
Balanced  
Policy 
Environment 
# 
Goal: Optimization of own- 
revenues and federal grants 
More Revenue  
* Disincentive:  Loss of Equalization Grants  
 
 
 
Mobile   
Tax Base  Tax Rate Own Revenue and Equalization Grants    
 
 
  Optimum own-source revenues and optimum 
equalization grants          
More Grants 
**Disincentive: Capital flight and Revenue Loss   
  
 
 x-1 
 
Right incentives for optimum tax policy 
 
 x+1 
 
 Mobile 
Immobile 
Immobile   x+1 
Mobile / 
Immobile 
 x  
  
Notes:  #Combine subnational revenue control with fiscal equalization system. 
*Disincentives of an SNG pursuing the extreme tax policy type-I in a balanced 
policy environment. ** Disincentives of an SNG pursuing the extreme tax policy 
type-I in a balanced policy environment. 
 
 Figure 2:  Balanced Policy Environment and Subnational Tax Policies 
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II. The Institutional Mechanisms for Optimal Fiscal Federal System 
   
The ‘optimal asymmetry’ is variable and cannot be definitively specified for all countries, or even a 
particular country at all times. One country at different times and different countries at one time have 
different levels of ‘optimal asymmetry’.  In fact, determining an ‘optimal distribution’ of taxing 
authority and spending responsibility is not a technical exercise because it cannot be based on some 
fixed universal standards of optimality. The notion of ‘optimal’ ― better than any other distribution ― 
is a relative and context-dependent concept; it is determined to a large extent by the nature of federal 
polity and the political consensus on policy goals.  
 
So the question of optimality must finally be addressed politically. Yet, it cannot be the product of ad 
hoc political bargaining either. Some have argued that the level of state taxation in any particular 
country is simply determined by the political ‘equilibrium’ of that country (Diaz-Cayeros 2006). This 
approach tends to justify any existing level of federal transfers or subnational taxation, even if they are 
a product of factors, such as the relative strength of the federal government vis-à-vis SNGs, the 
relative bargaining power of wealthier SNGs compared to poor SNGs, and the secession threats by 
SNGs that aspire to sovereignty. Such equilibrium, based on pure political bargaining, can distort the 
welfare enhancing and efficiency rationale of a fiscal federal structure.  
 
Furthermore, the power politics can preclude the rationalisation of the fiscal structure and can cause 
the allocations to lean excessively to either side of the centralization-decentralisation continuum. For 
example, in Russia, the government typically grants preferential fiscal agreements to the regions with 
the most serious separatist claims (Treisman 1999). In fact, weakening of the central government can 
potentially trigger the demand for more revenue authority to SNGs. This happened in Indonesia after 
the historic fall of the Soeharto Regime (1966–1998) in May 1998 and in Russia after ‘August 1998 
meltdown’ (economic paralysis and consequent devaluation of the Rouble on 17th August 1998).  This 
kind of decentralization is unlikely to promote a governance agenda based on transparency and 
accountability as is largely assumed in the neo-institutionalist perspective (see Hadiz 2004 for a critique 
of neo-institutionalist perspective). Hadiz (2004) draws on Indonesian experience to illustrate the way 
in which decentralization processes and institutions can be hijacked by a wide range of interests.  
 
In context of such experiences, some have argued that a given combination of non-federal and federal 
goods can be said to be optimal if it is identical with the combination that would result if the 
expenditure and taxing decisions of all jurisdictions were subject to national vote. Voting can be based 
on the majority rule (Hartle 1971, p. 103) or on the unanimity rule (Hettich and Winer 1986, p. 749-
50).  
 
Hettich and Winer advocated the unanimity rule because it prevents special interest groups from 
influencing fiscal outcomes. However, since unanimous voting is not a realistic possibility, the authors 
recommended a requirement to make decisions by pluralities larger than 50%. Lazar et al. (2004) and 
Dahlby (2005) argue that VFI exists when a particular level of government complains about 
insufficient funding and/or tax room and a wide majority of the public supports its cause. Though a 
public opinion poll is a significant factor, yet it is not sufficient because political leaders can always 
manipulate the voters by appealing to their prejudices, their parochial feelings, and their desire for 
short-term gains, even at the cost of long-term gains (Chelliah 2010, p. 22). 
 
In fact, political officials at both levels of government behave strategically, and therefore the challenge 
is to create self-enforcing institutions with inbuilt incentives to dissuade officials from indulging in a 
welfare-reducing and mutually destructive behaviour. Thus, I suggest a simultaneous co-existence of 
following features to maintain an optimal fiscal federal system:  
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i. An independent, arbitrating agency /commission 
 
An independent agency or commission of academics and professionals can undertake research on the 
tax-transfer arrangement required in a particular period. Countries like Australia, India, and South 
Africa have such independent agencies to work out the distribution of resources between the various 
levels of government.  
 
Quantifying optimality requires an objective assessment of a federal government’s resources and 
legitimate expenditure needs in a macro framework. However, there are reasonable differences on 
such assessments based on values, party politics, regional politics, and views on the nature of the 
federation and the economic role of government (i.e., the side one takes in intergovernmental 
disagreements on vertical fiscal relations).  
 
Nevertheless, the independent agency can determine the best set of assignments by gathering feedback 
on several variables, including the federal government’s expenditure needs and expected revenues, the 
SNGs’ expenditure requirements and expected revenues, and the extent to which transfers are 
required to achieve equalisation and national objectives. This feedback can be obtained from election 
results, public opinion polls, and political debates. Additionally, the financial markets provide a 
constant flow of information on the relative prices of federal and provincial goods in a particular 
period. This information is an important indicator of the spending needs of the two levels of 
government.   
 
In 2008, in response to the changing times, Australia’s Rudd Government decided to revise the 
country’s fiscal arrangements with the establishment of ‘The Australia's Future Tax System Review 
Panel’ under the Chairmanship of Dr. Ken Henry. This panel examined and made recommendations 
for Australia’s tax and transfer system, including state taxes.  
 
The Review Panel provided the opportunity for the Australian people to participate by holding public 
meetings in all the major cities. A series of analytical papers were also commissioned to explore 
significant tax and transfer policy issues. The government received the report on 23rd December 2009 
and is currently examining the report.   
 
Thus, an independent agency appointed by a government can provide fiscal guidance. However, in the 
absence of institutions for intergovernmental interactions, risk-averse political officials will avoid 
difficult decisions by taking the agency’s recommendations as optional propositions. However, the 
creation of collaborative political processes and forums for intergovernmental interactions, as argued 
in the next sub-section, can produce a mutually agreed upon, politically sustainable set of assignments. 
The existence of vibrant civic society organisations and fiscal rules can further steer intergovernmental 
interactions towards welfare-enhancing outcomes. 
 
ii. Collaborative intergovernmental institutions for sustained interactions 
    
Public economics scholars have tried to find solutions by incorporating cooperation into the fiscal 
structure itself. This suggestion, called co-occupancy, is often proposed for systems in which both levels 
of government jointly tax in the spirit of cooperative federalism. It is generally believed that co-
occupancy minimises the effects of tax disharmony, which is associated with tax separation. Boadway 
and Tremblay (2006) however, explicitly identified the lack of intergovernmental cooperation as a 
source of VFI, even in cases of joint taxation.  
 
Boadway and Tremblay (2006) analyze two forms of vertical externalities.  One, if SNGs are aware 
that federal government cannot commit to a level of transfers that is chosen before their spending 
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decisions, they just anticipate that the federal government will finance their expenditures. Thus they 
set their tax rates too low and spending too high. Second, if federal government is able to commit to a 
transfer policy, SNGs, concentrate on tax policy. They perceive that increase in tax rate by either level, 
will reduce the co-occupied tax base. This means part of the cost of rise in subnational tax rate will fall 
on the federal government. Thus SNGs , acting on behalf of their own residents,  fail to take into 
account the full cost of increase in tax rate, to the nation as a whole. Thus tax rates are set too high.   
 
Rodden and Wibbels (2002) analyze the tendency of SNGs to impose new priorities just to attract 
more transfers even when national level is under funding old commitments. They demonstrated that a 
lack of intergovernmental cooperation can lead to a “vertical war of attrition”, in which provincial and 
central officials attempt to shift fiscal burdens onto the other instead of implementing difficult 
adjustment measures.   
 
The above discussion indicates that the solution should be sought in the political arena. The 
institutions for sustained intergovernmental interactions can prove to governments that having sound 
public finances is in their best self-interests and that both levels of government should work as equal 
partners for co-production of policies. The Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling (1956) noted that if the 
parties take a long term perspective and do in fact interact repeatedly, their common interests may be 
sufficiently strong to sustain cooperation. Such an extended interaction can reduce the incentive to 
behave opportunistically. Fourçans and Thierry (2001) use game theory to argue that ‘infinite 
interactions’ prevent welfare-reducing strategic behaviours. Using a game theory model to analyse the 
European tax situation, Fourçans and Thierry argue, "It is of a paramount importance for a country to 
be able to give a strong signal to the other country that a war of attrition is possible. For that, 
countries must have sound public finances" (p. 17).  
 
Arora et al. (2008) have drawn attention to the need for greater ‘interactions in federal systems’. 
“Interaction involves a greater degree of interdependence between spheres than the simple model of 
distribution of powers suggests.” (Ibid p.4). In fact, as the dividing line between public and private is 
getting blurred, the government at all levels—central, regional and local—is increasingly becoming a 
co-producer of policies together with the private sector. Thus, the changed context has made the 
creation of ‘interactive networks of stakeholders’ an interesting policy option.    
 
This idea supplements the insights from the literature on ‘policy networks’— an idea rooted in 
political science literature on intergovernmental relations (see Rhodes 1998, 99). These ideas can be 
useful in modeling vertical and horizontal interactions and linkage mechanisms among the 
stakeholders. Although the prisoner’s dilemma suggests that voluntary co-operation is implausible, 
‘policy networks’ can facilitate infinite interactions that reveal interdependencies and induce 
cooperative behaviour.  
 
A well-guided rationale can even reveal to rich SNGs that it is in their long-term interests to make 
voluntary transfers to poor SNGs. Myers (1990), for instance, demonstrated that such contributions 
can benefit rich SNGs’ economies by discouraging inefficient regional migration. Thus, the 
collaborative intergovernmental processes for sustained interactions can prevent assignments from 
emerging on the basis of pure political bargaining, which is detrimentally informal and ad hoc.  
 
iii. Civic society organisations  
 
Civic society organisations can serve to generate and disseminate information about service delivery, 
with the specific purpose of verifying political promises and mobilizing voters in the area of public 
service provision (see Keefer and Khemani 2005). This suggestion rests on the assumption that 
politicians in all countries respect interests that can bring voters to polls. Thus, disseminating 
information among voters on the performance of public services and mobilizing them to hold political 
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agents accountable can encourage the political officials to improve public service delivery. Civic 
society organisations can play such a role. Reinikka and Svensson (2004) showed that in Uganda 
information dissemination strategy had a substantial impact in preventing leakage of funds away from 
purposes intended in public budgets.  
 
iv. Legislated fiscal rules or Fiscal Councils  
 
Legislated fiscal rules or Fiscal Councils can serve to enforce rule based fiscal discipline. This 
suggestion is based on international experience, as illustrated by Shah (2006) and (Debrun, Hauner, 
and Kumar 2009). The experience in Brazil, India, Russia, and South Africa supports the possibility 
that legislated fiscal rules in the form of budgetary balance controls, debt restrictions, tax or 
expenditure controls, and referenda for new taxation and spending initiatives can restrain pork-barrel 
politics and improve fiscal discipline (Shah 2006).  In fact, most U.S. states have legislative 
mechanisms to restrict unrestrained spending like balanced budget laws. Similarly, several Canadian 
provinces have introduced balanced budget legislation to discourage deficit financing. Furthermore, 
the success of ‘fiscal councils’ in Belgium, Denmark, and Sweden in ensuring fiscal discipline by 
providing independent assessments demonstrates that such institutions can reinforce government’s 
commitments to fiscal responsibility by raising the political costs of deviation (Debrun, Hauner, and 
Kumar 2009). For a review of the rationale for fiscal rules and the advantages and drawbacks 
associated with them, see Kennedy and Robbins (2003).  
 
Thus, civil society, legal-institutional and political-bargaining approaches should be combined to 
eliminate the possibility of distortion of fiscal outcomes by ad hoc political bargaining or by welfare-
reducing strategic behaviour by governments. To be consistent with a political economy approach, this 
solution is based on incentives and self-interest. The bottom-line is that intergovernmental fiscal 
arrangements must result from equal negotiations between the levels of government and must always 
aim at achieving maximum public welfare.  In order to protect the public welfare, the negotiating 
process must engage the non-government stake holders, because federal governance is not the 
exclusive preserve of government; there are other agencies like private sector and civil society 
organizations that are involved in governing a federal social order.   
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